Operational resilience regulation asks a financial entity to prove that it can keep running when its technology or its providers do not. In the European Union that duty is codified by the Digital Operational Resilience Act, which turns resilience into concrete, dated deliverables: a maintained register of every information and communication technology service arrangement, notification of major incidents on a defined clock, resilience testing, and formal oversight of critical third-party providers. In the United Kingdom the supervisory authorities pursue the same objective through a different construction, built on important business services, impact tolerances and self-assessment.
This pillar collects what the REGREP Regulatory Team publishes across both regimes — practitioner guides, the questions we are asked repeatedly, and reference material on the register templates and their validation rules. Every record cites at least one official source, the regulation, technical standard or authority guidance it rests on, and carries the date it was last reviewed. When a template version or a validation rule changes, the record is revised and the change is summarised rather than quietly replaced.
The register is where most of the work sits, and most of the pain is structural rather than conceptual. Entities and providers must be identified consistently across templates, contractual arrangements have to reconcile with the functions they support, provider identifiers must resolve, and the same entity has to appear the same way in every template that references it. A register that reads correctly to a human still fails on cross-template referential checks.
Nothing here is legal or regulatory advice, and submission mechanics differ by national competent authority even where the underlying standard does not. Confirm the current template version and submission channel with your authority before you file. When you are ready to build and validate the register rather than read about it, it maps to a REGREP module.
